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Sounds are encoded into electrical activity in the inner ear, where they are represented (roughly) as 
patterns of energy in narrow frequency bands. However, sounds are perceived in terms of their high-order 
properties. It is generally believed that this transformation is performed along the auditory hierarchy, with 
low-level physical cues computed at early stages of the auditory system and high-level abstract qualities 
at high-order cortical areas. The functional position of primary auditory cortex (A1) in this scheme is 
unclear – is it ‘early’, encoding physical cues, or is it ‘late’, already encoding abstract qualities? Here we 
argue that neurons in cat A1 show sensitivity to high-level features of sounds. In particular, these neurons 
may already show sensitivity to ‘auditory objects’. The evidence for this claim comes from studies in which 
individual sounds are presented singly and in mixtures. Many neurons in cat A1 respond to mixtures in the 
same way they respond to one of the individual components of the mixture, and in many cases neurons 
may respond to a low-level component of the mixture rather than to the acoustically dominant one, even 
though the same neurons respond to the acoustically-dominant component when presented alone.
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second, conﬂ  icting requirement is, therefore, the 
need to extract the relevant information out of the 
highly detailed   representation of the sound stream, 
in order to encode sounds in terms that are useful 
for guiding future behavior.
Representations of the relevant information may 
collapse many physically-different sounds into the 
same class: for example, when we have to understand 
a spoken message, a high-ﬁ  delity recording of the 
message, and the same message heard through a cel-
lular phone, would be considered ‘the same’. There 
may be, however, many different possible categoriza-
tions of these sounds: if we have to judge the quality 
of the sound reproduction, the high-ﬁ  delity record-
ing and the cellular phone message will be perceived 
as very good and very bad, respectively. Thus, in both 
tasks, ‘understanding’ and ‘quality judgment’, a large 
THE AUDITORY SYSTEM AND COMPLEX SOUNDS
The auditory system uses a time-varying signal – air 
pressure at the ear drum – for unimaginably com-
plex tasks, such as understanding speech, enjoy-
ing music or detecting very small changes in the 
soundscape that may indicate the approach of a 
hungry tiger. In order to perform all of these tasks, 
the mammalian auditory system has to accom-
modate two conﬂ  icting requirements. The ﬁ  rst is 
the need to encode sounds in all their details. The 
highly detailed representation of sounds is required 
in order to be able to detect informative, but physi-
cally small and context-dependent, changes in the 
soundscape. Such a highly detailed representa-
tion of the incoming sound stream is however 
far too complex to guide behavior, since much of 
this detail is irrelevant in any given situation. The 108 | July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1  www.frontiersin.org
set of physically-different sounds are classiﬁ  ed into 
a substantially smaller number of classes that are 
behaviorally meaningful. In that sense, the behav-
iorally-relevant representations are coarse (because 
each class may contain many   different physical 
sounds). This doesn’t mean that extracting the class 
label in each case is easy – extracting the sequence 
of spoken words from the acoustic waveform is the 
notoriously difﬁ  cult problem of automatic speech 
recognition, and quality judgments are very hard 
to capture by computer programs operating on the 
sounds themselves. Furthermore, sounds that have 
the same meaning may have very different quality, 
whereas sounds with the same quality may have very 
different meaning; thus, the labels in the ‘under-
standing’ and in the ‘quality judgment’ tasks are 
based on possibly very different physical features of 
the sounds, so that neither of them can fully replace 
the physically-detailed representation of the same 
sounds.
Thus, the auditory system has a ‘double personal-
ity’: it encodes sounds simultaneously with very high 
ﬁ  delity (Dallos, 1996) and also in a   behaviorally-
  relevant, coarse way (Yost and Sheft, 1993). This 
double personality can be observed in perceptual 
experiments. On the one hand, humans can dis-
criminate low-level physical features of sounds 
astoundingly well: the smallest frequency difference 
that can be perceived (admittedly, by highly-trained 
humans) is about 0.2% (whereas the basic interval 
of western music, the half-tone, is 6%, Moore, 2003). 
On the other hand, categorical perception experi-
ments show that when a physical change in a speech 
sound is not informative, it will be not be perceived 
very well (Eggermont and Ponton, 2002).
The tension between high-resolution represen-
tations and coarse but behaviorally-relevant repre-
sentations is reﬂ  ected in current thinking about the 
structure and function of the auditory   system. The 
representation of sounds at the level of the auditory 
nerve, the cochlear nucleus (the ﬁ  rst central station 
of the auditory system), and the inferior colliculus 
(an obligatory midbrain station without an obvious 
homolog in other sensory systems), is generally con-
sidered to be highly detailed (e.g., Casseday et al., 
2002). Single trials of single neurons in inferior 
colliculus are sufﬁ  cient to reach human discrimi-
nation levels when decoded optimally, admittedly 
with a lot of precautionary notes (e.g., Shackleton 
et al., 2003, 2005). In this sense, the inferior col-
liculus may be considered as the neural substrate 
underlying the HiFi industry. On the other hand, 
responses in primary auditory cortex (A1) of cats 
and rodents are much coarser, leading already many 
years ago to the suggestion that A1 encodes sounds 
in terms that go beyond their acoustic structure 
(e.g., Wollberg and Newman, 1972). Human fMRI 
data seems to be roughly consistent with such a 
hierarchical model. For example, speech is processed 
along multiple streams originating in A1, with more 
abstract representations occurring farther away 
from this structure (Scott and Johnsrude, 2003). 
Similarly, the most detailed conceptualization of 
sound processing in the primate brain, the ‘where 
and what pathways’ model (Rauschecker and Tian, 
2000; Romanski et al., 1999) and its more elabo-
rated descendents (Belin and Zatorre, 2000; Zatorre 
et al., 2002), suggests that the acoustic information, 
which is encoded in physical terms in A1, might 
be processed along a posterior pathway to extract 
its spatial properties (‘where’) and along an ante-
rior pathway to extract other high-level properties. 
In both models, A1 is ‘low-level’ while the coarser, 
behaviorally-relevant representations evolve along 
the information streams away from A1.
Evidence for or against abstract representations 
of sounds by single neurons in A1 has been elusive. 
By far, most studies of A1 have used, and still use, very 
simple stimuli such as pure tones and broad-band 
noise (Bizley et  al., 2005; Hromadka et  al., 2008; 
Moshitch et al., 2006; Nelken et al., 2004; Qin et al., 
2003; Read et al., 2002; Tan et al., 2004; Ulanovsky 
et al., 2003; Wehr and Zador, 2003). There are very 
good reasons for these choices. The use of complex 
sounds requires complex experimental designs, not 
always compatible with the limited amount of time 
available for recording neural responses. Thus, for 
example, Wollberg’s studies on the coding of spe-
cies-speciﬁ  c vocalizations in the squirrel monkey 
A1 started with the speculation that neurons in 
A1 encode these sounds according to their mean-
ing rather than according to their acoustic structure 
(Wollberg and Newman, 1972), but ended 20 years 
later with a paper suggesting population coding of 
acoustic features (Pelleg-Toiba and Wollberg, 1991). 
This change occurred to a large extent because more 
rigorous acoustic controls have been applied over 
the years (e.g., Glass and Wollberg, 1983). Complex 
sounds also require more complex data analysis 
tools, which were lacking in the past and are cur-
rently in active development (Ahrens et al., 2008; 
Nelken and Chechik, 2007). On the other hand, 
even pure tones evoke highly non-trivial response in 
auditory cortex. To mention just a few such results, 
the highly complex structure of binaural interac-
tions (Semple and Kitzes, 1993), the high sensitivity 
of cortical neurons to sound onsets (Heil and Irvine, 
1996; as interpreted by Fishbach et al., 2001; Heil 
and Neubauer, 2003), or sound-level independent 
frequency coding (Phillips and Orman, 1984) have 
all been crucial for our current understanding of 
auditory cortex function and were all described in 
studies using simple stimuli such as pure tones and 
broadband noise bursts. Nevertheless, these studies 
Nelken and Bar-YosefFrontiers in Neuroscience  July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1 | 109
could not address the issue of abstract representa-
tions in auditory cortex.
In fact, currently, even research programs that 
employ complex sounds to study A1 tend to avoid 
the issue of abstract representations. Instead, such 
programs emphasize the interpretation of the 
responses in terms of feature detection, where the 
features might be complex but relatively limited in 
time (with a typical duration of 10–100 ms). Along 
this line, the highly inﬂ  uential paper of deCharms 
et al. (1998) showed a selection of spectro- temporal 
receptive ﬁ   elds (STRF) with complex structure, 
  suggesting that these are an important feature of 
sound processing in A1. However, further research, 
both in awake and in anaesthetized animals, has 
generally failed to ﬁ  nd highly complex STRFs, at 
least in the majority of cases (Ahrens et al., 2008; 
Depireux et al., 2001). Using a different approach, 
Wang et al. (2005) demonstrated the presence, in 
A1 of awake marmosets, of neurons that can be 
tonically driven but only by a stimulus with rather 
speciﬁ   c set of physical parameters such as fre-
quency, sound level, or amplitude and frequency 
modulation patterns, and rates.
While these data emphasize the view of A1 as a 
collection of highly speciﬁ  c feature detectors, all of 
the above studies still used artiﬁ  cial sounds (even 
if rather complex ones). It remains possible that an 
abstract representation in A1 will only be elicited 
by more natural sounds, varying along appropriate 
abstract dimensions. However, what are precisely 
those abstract dimensions? Most studies using 
 species-speciﬁ  c vocalizations did not uncover any 
dramatically different responses to such sounds. More 
generally, natural sounds do not evoke responses 
that are very different from those evoked by artiﬁ  cial 
sounds in A1. The recent study of Hromadka et al. 
(2008), for example, showed that in A1 of awake rats, 
population responses to pure tones and to an ensem-
ble of natural sounds are rather similar – if at all, the 
average responses to tones were somewhat larger 
than the responses to natural sounds.
CAT AUDITORY CORTEX AND BIRD CHIRPS
We would like to argue here that there is a common 
conceptual drawback to all of these attempts to study 
A1. In fact, all of the above studies address the ‘easy 
problem’ of auditory processing: that of discriminat-
ing sounds from each other (Nelken and Ahissar, 
2006). At least some neurons in A1 should be able 
to discriminate between any tokens of different pho-
nemes or different words: these are stimuli that are 
physically different, and therefore they evoke differ-
ent patterns of activity in the auditory nerve (e.g., 
Hienz et al., 1996; May et al., 1996). Such differences 
should be detectable also by neural activity at the 
level of the auditory cortex. The ‘hard problem’ of 
auditory processing is very different. It is the fact that 
in real life, sounds are rarely heard by themselves. 
Instead, we usually hear sounds in mixtures, and the 
task of separating a mixture of sounds into its indi-
vidual components is a hard computational problem 
(Bregman, 1990; Wang and Brown, 2006). We claim 
that the solution to this problem is an abstract high-
level representation, because the notion of a compo-
nent of a sound mixture is a high-level one. Sounds 
can be decomposed into components in many dif-
ferent ways. A  case in point is the decomposition 
of sounds into narrow frequency bands that is per-
formed at the inner ear. This decomposition, while 
basic to the function of the auditory system, does not 
result in most cases in perceptually-relevant compo-
nents. For example, a complex periodic sound will 
be broken into groups of harmonics that will be rep-
resented in different frequency channels, but none of 
these components will be perceptually present in the 
sound in any obvious way (except maybe to highly-
trained listeners!).
Inspite of this indeterminacy, the solution to the 
problem of separating a mixture of sounds into per-
ceptually-valid components is very often obvious in 
natural settings, and is related (although not identi-
cal) to the problem of separating a sound mixture 
into components that have been emitted by dif-
ferent sound sources. Such decompositions make 
ecological sense, since they represent the sound in 
terms that are useful for guiding behavior. These 
notions are obviously close to the highly charged 
term ‘auditory object’ (Grifﬁ  ths and Warren, 2004; 
Winkler et al., 2006).
To be concrete, we are going to limit ourselves to 
a rather simple situation: that of a main, narrowband 
sound such as a bird chirp, heard as a part of a natural 
noisy scene, but dominating it. In this case, the audi-
tory objects are obvious: the bird chirp is one object, 
while the background noise is another, with possi-
ble further subdivisions of the background. Figure 1 
illustrates a speciﬁ  c example, used by Bar-Yosef and 
Nelken (2007). Here the full natural sound (Natural 
chirp) is divided into the clean Main chirp and the 
background noise (Noise). The Noise has two dis-
tinct components: a narrowband component in the 
range of frequencies that are present in the chirp, 
presumably representing the echoes of the chirp; and 
a wideband component that may result from multi-
ple sources. If the Main chirp is sufﬁ  ciently louder 
than the background noise, it will be easy to detect. 
Thus the interesting auditory question in this case 
is whether there are neurons that encode speciﬁ  -
cally the background (Noise in Figure 1, or even the 
weaker background component), in spite of the fact 
that it is acoustically much weaker. But why should 
encoding the background be an important or inter-
esting auditory task? One answer to this question is 
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Figure 1 | Spectrograms (left) and peri-stimulus time histograms of the responses of a primary-like unit in the ventral 
 cochlear nucleus of a cat (right). The stimuli were a segment of a natural sound consisting of a bird chirp and its natural background 
(top), the clean bird chirp (middle) and the background (bottom). These sounds have been used in Bar-Yosef and Nelken (2007).
that the background might contain highly   pertinent 
  information to a mid-size predator such as the cat: it 
may contain information regarding other prey (such 
as the mouse rustling in the grass) and about natural 
enemies (such as humans trying to catch it).
It is difﬁ  cult to demonstrate that a neuron respond 
speciﬁ  cally to an acoustic component. To do so, it is 
necessary to contrast a standard representation of 
the neural responses, such as a frequency response 
area that charts the responses to pure tones, with the 
responses to the natural sounds. At the least, such 
a neuron should respond identically to all stimuli 
that contain this acoustic component, independent 
of other sounds that are simultaneously present. 
Furthermore, we would like to have neurons that 
respond as expected to pure tones, but that have 
surprising responses to the natural sounds and their 
components, responses that cannot be accounted 
for by the frequency response area but are consistent 
with the idea of the representation of abstract enti-
ties. The cochlear nucleus neuron whose responses 
are shown in Figure 1 clearly does not show such 
speciﬁ  c responses: it respond to the natural chirp 
and to the main chirp with similar response pat-
terns, while it responds to the noise with a different 
response pattern.
In two papers, Bar-Yosef and colleagues (Bar-
Yosef and Nelken, 2007; Bar-Yosef et al., 2002) dem-
onstrated the presence of neurons that show such 
speciﬁ  c responses to acoustic components in cat A1. 
Figure 2 shows an example of the responses of such 
a neuron, and the way that the neural responses to 
a natural sound and its components were studied. 
The frequency response area of the neuron is shown 
at the top Figure 2. The plot shows response (coded 
by color) as a function of frequency and sound level. 
The power spectra of the clean bird chirp (white) 
and the background (red) are superimposed, to 
emphasize the fact that this neuron is sensitive to 
the frequencies present in the clean bird chirp, and 
that the chirp is substantially louder than the back-
ground. Each of the panels below is composed of 
the spectrogram of a stimulus, together with a raster 
plot showing the spike patterns evoked by 20 repeti-
tions of that sound. The process of decomposition 
of the sound is illustrated by the tree structure: at the 
top, the response to the full natural sound is shown. 
The neuron responded to this sound with a vigor-
ous onset response followed by a weaker response. 
The natural sound was separated into the clean 
chirp (middle row, right) and to the background 
(middle row, left). Surprisingly, the response to the 
clean chirp was rather weak, whereas the robust 
onset response was present in the response to the 
background. At a second step, the background 
itself was separated into echoes of the clean chirp 
(bottom row, right) and the wideband surround 
(bottom row, left). Again, surprisingly, the robust 
onset response was evoked by the low-level wide-
band surround.
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When tested with pure tones, the neuron in 
Figure 2 was typical of A1, having a low-threshold 
narrow frequency response area (top of Figure 2). 
Neurons with such tuning curves in early auditory 
stations would respond to the bird chirp with or 
without the presence of the background noise (see 
Figure 1 and Chechik et al., 2006). Cortical neurons 
with such narrow frequency response area would 
be expected to be insensitive to wideband stimuli 
(Schreiner and Mendelson, 1990). However, back-
ground noise had an inordinate inﬂ  uence on the 
responses of the neuron in Figure 2. In particular, 
the similarly robust onset response to the full natu-
ral sound and to the background (when presented 
alone) suggests that the onset response was evoked 
by the onset of the background, rather than by the 
onset of the main chirp, even when played together 
as part of the full natural sound. Thus, the neuron 
seems to have responded speciﬁ  cally to the wide-
band background, independently of presence of 
other, dominant acoustic component. Such capture 
of the responses of a neuron by a speciﬁ  c compo-
nent of the natural sounds was typical (Bar-Yosef 
and Nelken, 2007). We would like to conclude that 
the capture of the responses of neurons in cat A1 
by speciﬁ  c sound components is a partial solution 
of the problem of separating a sound mixture into 
its components. Furthermore, it seems that A1 neu-
rons tend to perform the hard part of the decom-
position process, in that they respond to the weak 
component in the mixture.
One possible critique of this interpretation of the 
results of Bar-Yosef and collaborators (2002, 2007) is 
that neurons in cat A1 might be especially sensitive 
to broadband sounds, and that this is the reason why 
neurons responded to the broadband components of 
the mixture. However, the neurons studied in these 
papers are rather typical to cat A1 (Bar-Yosef et al., 
2002; Moshitch et al., 2006). Furthermore, Las et al. 
(2005) demonstrated a kind of converse to the results 
of Bar-Yosef and collaborators (2002, 2007). In their 
study, the loud acoustic component was ﬂ  uctuating 
noise (such as is often found in a natural auditory 
scene, Nelken et al., 1999), while the low-level com-
ponent was a pure tone. Las et al. (2005) showed that 
neurons in inferior colliculus (two synapses before 
auditory cortex) already showed extremely sensitive 
thresholds to tones in ﬂ  uctuating noise (by respond-
ing to the tones in the energy minima of the ﬂ  uctuat-
ing maskers), but that the responses of neurons in A1 
were captured by the low-level tones, in a way that 
resembled the capture of similar A1 neurons by low-
level wideband sound components as described by 
Bar-Yosef and Nelken (2007). Thus, neurons   similar 
to those studied by Bar-Yosef and Nelken (2007) 
showed an extreme sensitivity to low-level tones 
(a narrowband stimulus) in a high-level masker (a 
wideband stimulus). It can be cautiously concluded 
that it is not a speciﬁ  c sensitivity of A1 neurons to 
wideband stimuli that is implicated here. As in the 
studies of Bar-Yosef and collaborators (2002, 2007), 
the results of Las et al. (2005) can be interpreted in 
terms of representation of auditory objects, except 
that here the low-level object is the pure tone, which 
is detected at the level of the inferior colliculus, but is 
represented much more explicitly and clearly in A1, 
in spite of its low level.
Support for the idea that neurons in A1 encode 
auditory objects is also given by another line of 
research: the highly sensitive stimulus-speciﬁ  c 
adaptation that was described in A1 of cats by 
Figure 2 | The frequency response area of a neuron in cat primary auditory cortex (top) and 
its responses to a natural chirp and some of its modiﬁ  ed versions. Further details in the text.
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Ulanovsky et al. (2003, 2004). Oddball sequences, 
consisting of many repetitions of one pure tone 
frequency interspersed with rare presentations 
of another, nearby frequency, were used to study 
the effects of tone probability on single-neuron 
responses. Response size was inversely related to 
the probability tone presentation. The commonly 
presented tones showed adaptation with time con-
stants on the order of 10–100 s, but rare tones that 
could be very close in frequency (10% or even 4% 
away from the common tone) showed much less or 
even no adaptation. This stimulus speciﬁ  city was 
much better than the bandwidth of the neurons at 
the sound levels in which they were tested, which 
was an octave or more. Furthermore, behaviorally, 
frequency discrimination thresholds in cats are 
about 4% (Masterton et al., 1992). One interpre-
tation of these results is that the neurons respond 
more strongly to the rare tone because it indi-
cates the presence of a new auditory object in the 
soundscape.
CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS
What are the relationships between these ﬁ  ndings 
and those showing high and complex   selectivity 
of neural responses to physical cues, reviewed 
in   section “The auditory system and complex 
sounds”? These two sets of ﬁ  ndings are not nec-
essarily in conﬂ   ict. Many studies of parameter 
  selectivity in A1 do not address in any way the issue 
of object representation and therefore cannot be 
used to refute the presence of object representation 
in A1. Furthermore, the high selectivity to speciﬁ  c 
complex physical features, (e.g., Wang et al., 2005) 
may create building blocks that give rise to object-
related responses. Experiments like those described 
here, using natural or naturalistic mixtures, have 
not been conducted together with parametric stud-
ies of stimulus selectivity; such experiments are 
obviously necessary in order to elucidate the rela-
tionships between the two views of processing in 
auditory cortex discussed here.
How are we then to interpret the role of A1 in 
hearing? We suggest that A1 neurons encode much 
more than just the physical properties of recent 
sounds. In addition to these properties, they encode 
the context in which these sounds occur (as in 
Ulanovsky et al., 2003, 2004) and they may be highly 
selective to the auditory objects present in the scene 
(as in Bar-Yosef and Nelken, 2007; Bar-Yosef et al., 
2002; Las et al., 2005). To the anatomical position 
of A1 as a hub from which information ﬂ  ows in dif-
ferent functional streams (Romanski et al., 1999), 
we can add now an important role in information 
processing. We would like to suggest that A1 pro-
duces representations of auditory objects, which 
are the entities that are processed in higher audi-
tory areas. These higher auditory areas may assign 
properties such as pitch, spatial location, identity 
and meaning to the objects that are generated by the 
neural processes occurring in A1.
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